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Abstract 
 
The cocoa sector is of vital importance to Ghana, employing millions of people and 
contributing important revenues to the government. In order to raise prices received by 
producers and to increase overall performance of the cocoa sector, a number of reforms were 
undertaken, where the most important opened up the internal market to competition. The 
thesis examines how the reforms of the Ghanaian cocoa sector have affected its performance 
in terms of producer prices, production, yields and quality levels. The conclusion is that 
through the reforms producer prices, production and yields have increased, while quality 
levels have been maintained. In comparison with other cocoa producing countries that have 
undergone more extensive liberalisation reforms, the performance of the Ghanaian cocoa 
sector is still relatively low and could increase if further liberalisation takes place. 
 
Keywords: Ghana, cocoa, market chain, liberalisation, competition, performance.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The popular saying Cocoa is Ghana, Ghana is Cocoa illuminates the importance of cocoa 
production in Ghana.
1
 Ghana is one of the largest suppliers of cocoa on the world market and 
its cocoa sector employs millions of people. It is not only small-scale farmers that are 
dependent on earnings from cocoa, but also the Ghanaian state, and now more than ever since 
cocoa in 2004 became Ghana’s main source of export revenue.2 
 
The cocoa is used to extract cocoa butter, cocoa paste and cocoa powder which in large parts 
are consumed as chocolate confectionery and other cocoa-based food products. Cocoa is a 
commodity that directly links consumption patterns of consumers in the developed world with 
the overall well-being of farmers and rural workers in developing countries. The demand for 
the product increases each year as a result of rising living standards, development of new 
products containing cocoa, advertising campaigns and reports of the health effects of 
chocolate that reach the market in developed countries.
3
 
 
In many cocoa producing countries where the cocoa sector was controlled by the state, the 
sector has gone through a liberalisation process. In Ghana, the cocoa sector has not been as 
liberalised as in its neighbouring cocoa producing countries and is thus still, to a large extent, 
controlled by the government. A partial liberalisation of the sector has however taken place, 
opening up for the possibility of increasing production and higher producer prices.  
1.1 Purpose  
The purpose of the thesis is to analyse and evaluate the structure and reforms of the cocoa 
sector in Ghana through chosen indicators of performance. The thesis also suggests further 
reforms to improve the sector’s performance by discussing possible gains and risks of further 
liberalisation.  
 
                                                 
1
 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (1) (2009-07-22).  
2
 ICCO, 2006, p 20 
3
 Ibid, p 13-16 
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1.2 Methodology 
In order to obtain information, interviews and meetings were held with representatives of 
farmers, private buying companies, the Ghanaian government, University of Ghana and other 
stakeholders on the internal cocoa market in Ghana. Additionally, various sources of literature 
have been used as well as statistics obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO), International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) and Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD).  
 
Caution has to be taken to the fact that information given in interviews and meetings may 
have been misinterpreted and/or not correctly given, due to underlying interests or different 
forms of pressure of and on the respondent. The answers given could also have been modified 
in order to fit assumed interests of the interviewers. The information used in the thesis has, in 
most cases, been confirmed in other interviews or in other sources.  
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the world cocoa market – cocoa 
producing countries, world supply and demand of cocoa and development of world market 
prices. Section 3 gives a summary of liberalisation processes in cocoa producing West 
African countries. Section 4 focuses on the Ghanaian cocoa sector, with an overview of the 
economic background followed by an exhaustive presentation of the internal and the external 
cocoa markets. In section 5, the degree of competition on the internal Ghanaian cocoa market 
is examined. Section 6 evaluates the performance of the Ghanaian cocoa sector and relates it 
to institutional arrangements and reforms of the internal market chain of cocoa. The thesis is 
concluded and gains and risks of further liberalisation are discussed in section 7. 
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2 World Cocoa Market 
 
In order to more fully understand in what context the Ghanaian cocoa sector operates, this 
section gives an overview of the market forces regulating the international cocoa market and 
the development of the world market price as well as an introduction to the production of 
cocoa and the cocoa producing countries.  
2.1 Supply, Demand and World Cocoa Price 
Cocoa is grown on trees and the cocoa fruits grow directly on the stems and branches. There 
exist different types of trees, all having in common that it takes a couple of years after 
planting until they bear fruit, which they do for approximately 30 years. Cocoa is reaped 
continuously throughout the year, since the seed cases do not ripen at the same time. In West 
Africa they are collected most intensively in the harvest seasons December and June, together 
constituting a crop year. The cocoa fruits are cut down by hand, often using long machetes. 
Machines cannot be used because it is not possible to harvest all beans at the same time. The 
seeds are fermented on the ground for around seven days and dried for approximately three 
weeks, before they are packed in bags and exported.
4
  
 
Although cocoa originally came from South America, West Africa is the primary producer of 
cocoa today. Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon produce two-thirds and export 
three-quarters of total world cocoa production. Ghana was the primary producer of cocoa for 
most of the 20
th
 century, and is today the second largest producer after Côte d’Ivoire.5 The 
third largest producer is Indonesia and other big producers are Brazil, Malaysia and Ecuador.
6 
Figure 1 illustrates the development of exports of cocoa by the three largest cocoa producing 
countries. The share of total exports supplied by Côte d’Ivoire decreased by 15 percent 
because of its civil war, while the share supplied by Ghana increased from 15 to 19 percent. 
The amount supplied by Indonesia remained fairly constant, except for a substantial increase 
in the last crop year. Around 30 countries belong to the category labelled “rest of world”, 
                                                 
4
 Bartholdson & Valentin, 2006, p 14 and Interview Tetteh Quarshie farm (2009-04-17) 
5
 Bartholdson & Valentin, 2006, p 14 
6
 ul Haque, 2004, p 2. Statistics from FAO (2009) indicate that Ghana since crop year 2007/08 is the third largest 
producer in the world after Côte d’Ivoire and Indonesia. It is hard to determine which country that is the second 
largest, since Ghana’s and Indonesia’s production volumes have been of almost equal size the last years. 
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indicating that they are small suppliers of cocoa, even if their share has increased. Most 
exports are directed to Europe which is both the biggest processor and consumer of cocoa.
7
   
 
Figure 1: Exports of cocoa, by main exporting countries, 2000 – 2006 
 
Source: ICCO, 2008, p 12; ICCO, 2006, Annex 1, p 12 and own calculations 
 
During crop years 1998/99 to 2007/08 global cocoa production increased from around 2.8 
million tonnes to 3.7 million tonnes, with an average annual growth rate of 2.7 percent. 
Consumption showed similar patterns, with an average annual increase of 2.9 percent, from 
2.9 million tonnes to 3.7 million tonnes.
8
 Figure 2 portrays supply and demand of cocoa on 
the world cocoa market between 1980 and 2007, showing that they on the whole were 
balanced. Demand is measured by total grindings of cocoa, and supply is measured by gross 
crop production of cocoa. During the second half of the 1980s, a divergence existed between 
supply and demand, caused by excess production of cocoa. The cocoa price is very sensitive 
to changes in supply since supply cannot quickly adjust to changes in demand, due to slow 
maturity of cocoa trees and inability of farmers to switch to other crops in times of supply 
surplus.
9
  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Bartholdson & Valentin, 2006, p 13 
8
 ICCO, 2008, p 3  
9
 ICCO, 2006, p 7 
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Figure 2: Global supply and demand in the world cocoa market, 1980 – 2007 
 
Source: ICCO, 2008, p 29 
 
In conformity with prices of other primary products, the cocoa price has been categorised by 
wide fluctuations and a declining relative price. Many developing countries are highly 
dependent on commodity trade and fluctuations of the world market price of such products 
are of large concern to policy makers.
10
 Commodity prices tend to change from day to day, as 
well as varying during planting, harvesting and exporting periods of the crop, making the 
price difficult to forecast.
11
 
 
A reason for the declining relative price of cocoa is the increase of cocoa supplied on the 
world market; total supply has doubled today compared to the beginning of the 1980s, see 
figure 2. Several cocoa producing countries entered the market during the 1980s because of 
the at that time relatively high price of cocoa, and, more recently, cocoa supply has increased 
due to more efficient processing methods.
12
 Figure 3 portrays the development of the world 
price of cocoa expressed in current and constant prices. The price decreased steadily until the 
beginning of the new century when it recovered slightly. Another factor contributing to the 
pattern of falling prices was the tendency of industries to hold large stocks of cocoa, which 
meant that market participants did not dread the risk of future shortages.
13
 
 
                                                 
10
 Bartholdson & Valentin, 2006, p 13 
11
 ICCO, 2006, p 7 
12
 Bartholdson & Valentin, 2006, p 15 
13
 ICCO, 2006, p 3 
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Figure 3: International cocoa prices, 1980 – 2007  
 
Source: ICCO, 2008, p 30 
 
As illustrated in figure 3, the price decline was reversed in 2001. Several factors contributed 
to the increasing prices of which the most influential were changing stock-holding behaviour 
of the industries, social unrest in Côte d’Ivoire and lower yields of cocoa. The lower yields 
were caused by farmers’ lower ability to maintain production levels due to a period of lower 
incomes and thus absence of sufficient resources.
14
 After the peak around 2002/03, prices 
have once again declined, inter alia due to increased supply from the largest producers. 
Moreover, unstable weather conditions, instability in Côte d’Ivoire, uncertainty and lack of 
information about risks and market imperfections as well as the mentioned fundamental 
features of commodity markets in general, result in volatile prices.
15
  
2.2 Production and Institutional Structure  
There exist large differences between cocoa producing countries concerning size and 
effectiveness of cocoa farms. In Brazil and Malaysia farms are big and run like commercial 
firms in the sense that they view profit as the most important reason for growing cocoa and 
are more prepared to withdraw when market conditions are unfavourable. In West Africa, 
most of the cocoa is produced on small family farms where income received from the cocoa 
harvest constitutes the livelihood of farmers.
16
  
 
                                                 
14
 ICCO, 2006, p 5  
15
 ICCO, 2008, p 7-9 
16
 Bartholdson & Valentin, 2006, p 15-16 
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The cocoa sector can be administered in different ways. One way is to let market forces 
determine prices and quantities produced. This situation is characterised by many private 
actors and little intervention from the government. This usually enables producers to receive 
higher price for their harvests, but the volatility of the market price also makes them more 
vulnerable. Despite the fact that the cocoa market is under influence from world market 
forces, the state can intervene to coordinate private actors and control quality and level of 
taxation of the cocoa produced.  
 
Different from the free market approach is the marketing board system where the state 
controls production methods and the internal market chain of cocoa. There may be a few 
private actors that have influence over certain parts of the production chain, but it is the 
government that sets producer prices and handles exports. If producers are unorganised, they 
have little or no influence over their revenues.  
 
In the middle of these two extremes is the system with a stabilisation fund. It resembles the 
marketing board system in the sense that producer prices are determined by the government 
and that the fund handles exports and domestic markets. But it does not exercise control over 
the physical handling of the crop, even though it determines the agents that can act on the 
internal market. The prices are set to prevent fluctuations and the idea is to accumulate 
reserves when world market prices are high and to use these reserves to support cocoa 
producers when world market prices are low.
17
 The characteristics of different marketing and 
pricing systems are portrayed in table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Varangis & Schreiber, 2001, p 40-41 
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Table 1: Characteristics of different cocoa marketing and pricing systems 
Source: Varangis & Schreiber, 2001, p 41 
 
Most cocoa producing countries have to various degrees adopted market-oriented reforms. 
The cocoa sectors in Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria, for example, all operate under 
such conditions. Even in countries where the government has more influence over the 
production chain, such as Cameroon, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, the systems have been partly 
liberalised. Following liberalisation of cocoa markets, the price that farmers receive for their 
products is largely determined by the world market price. This indicates that farmers may 
receive higher, but more insecure earnings, due to on the one hand volatile world market 
prices and on the other hand country-specific production and economic conditions. A long-
term negative consequence of liberalisation may thus be that farmers will not be protected in 
periods of low market prices, since it is, as mentioned, hard to adjust governmental policies 
according to volatile market prices. A positive aspect of liberalisation is that marketing costs 
and taxes appear to be lower in countries that are liberalised, indicating more efficient 
production.
18
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 ul Haque, 2004, p 8 and Varangis & Schreiber, 2001, p 40-42 
Characteristics Free market Stabilisation fund Marketing board 
Legal ownership  Traders, exporters Traders, exporters Marketing board 
of crop 
   Physical handling  Traders, exporters Licensed private agents Marketing board 
of crop 
   Domestic price  Market forces Stabilisation fund Marketing board  
setting 
  
and government 
Price stabilisation None Yes Yes, but not explicit 
Taxation Absent or very low Mainly explicit Implicit 
Marketing costs and Low Medium to high High 
margins 
   Producer prices High Medium to low Low 
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3 Liberalisation Reforms in West Africa 
 
To get a better picture of the issues at stake in Ghana, a brief overview of liberalisation 
reforms in other West African countries is presented in this section. Since Ghana in terms of 
production conditions and market structure has less in common with cocoa producing 
countries on other continents than with its neighbouring countries, these countries have not 
been taken into account as reference material.  
 
The former colonial powers France and Great Britain established stabilisation funds and 
marketing board systems. These systems turned out to be inefficient and their efficiency 
declined further after independence was gained, leading to large costs of operations mainly 
paid by cocoa producers. As a condition for the Structural Adjustment Programmes, the 
World Bank required reforms of the cocoa sectors, in order to diminish operation costs and 
raise producer revenues. A free market system was thought to give farmers better prices in the 
long term. All cocoa producing countries in West Africa undertook some reforms – Nigeria, 
Togo and Cameroon reformed the whole system, while Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana chose a more 
partial and gradual approach to liberalisation.
19
  
3.1 Nigeria 
Until the 1970s, Nigeria was one of the leading suppliers of cocoa, but due to low producer 
prices, migration from the countryside to the cities and cocoa pod diseases, Nigeria today 
accounts for only six percent of total global supply. During the decline period, the marketing 
board Nigerian Cocoa Board (NCB) was the sole buyer and exporter of cocoa and controlled 
the internal market chain. The NCB was abolished in 1986, as a part of more general 
economic reforms, and prices were thus set by market forces, leading to higher but more 
volatile prices and an abandoned quality control. This, in addition to the entry of 
inexperienced middlemen in both internal and external market chains, led to quality 
deterioration and loss of the cocoa premium for Nigeria, resulting in lower sales and revenue 
losses for the government. Farmers formed cooperatives to sell directly to exporters, in order 
to avoid problems with inexperienced middlemen. As an effect of internal market 
liberalisation, private players have started to provide additional services to farmers, leading to 
                                                 
19
 ul Haque, 2004, p 7-8 and Laven, 2005, p 18 
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higher quality control and credit possibilities. These private initiatives are to be encouraged in 
other fields, such as research, in order to strengthen cooperation between different actors on 
the market chain.
20
  
3.2 Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d’Ivoire accounts for around 40 percent of total cocoa supply. Prior to liberalisation, 
private exporters were allowed to operate on the market even if both internal and external 
markets were controlled by a state-owned company. In the middle of the 1990s, the state’s 
control was diminished, in order to reduce marketing costs, raise producer prices and 
encourage the creation of producers’ organisations. The reforms increased production, but did 
not lead to sufficient changes for farmers, which brought about further liberalisation reforms 
in 1999. This led to a reconstruction of the state owned company, which only got a limited 
monitoring role, and a full liberalisation of the producer price. However, the contemporary 
decline in world market prices led to lower revenues for farmers, who protested against the 
newly installed system. Due to the civil war, which started in 1999, Côte d’Ivoire’s 
production decreased and hence the world market price increased, since the country has a 
significant share of world cocoa production. This has, however, not benefited producers in 
Côte d’Ivoire. In recent years the government has tried to strengthen the position of farmers 
by providing information about prices and encouraging farmers to form cooperatives to gain 
more bargaining power.
21
 
3.3 Cameroon 
Until 1990, the cocoa chain in Cameroon was controlled by a stabilisation fund that managed 
exports, price settings and quality controls. Buying companies were allowed to operate under 
regulations on the internal market. Due to declining international cocoa prices and overvalued 
exchange rates, the fund cut producer prices and faced serious financial problems. This led to 
a reconstruction of the sector in 1994, including a reform of the stabilisation fund and 
introduction of a floor price for producers. A more thorough liberalisation was carried through 
in crop year 1994/95, leading to a free market system where prices and margins are totally 
determined by the world market and any company can buy and export cocoa. The former 
stabilisation fund is now in charge of quality control and maintaining statistics. The reforms 
resulted in over two hundred purchasing companies, but only a dozen of them are considered 
                                                 
20
 Laven, 2005, p 18-21 and Varangis & Schreiber, 2001, p 65 
21
 Laven, 2005, p 21-23 
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large actors. As an effect of liberalisation, producers receive higher prices. Cocoa quality has 
been negatively affected, but this may not entirely have been due to liberalisation since 
production of cocoa at the same time was shifted to less productive sites.
22
  
3.4 Togo 
Togo is one of the smallest cocoa producers in West Africa, accounting for only one percent 
of total global supply.
23
 Despite this, the cocoa sector plays an important role in the country’s 
economy. Prior to liberalisation, cocoa prices as well as external and internal market were 
controlled by a marketing board. The country undertook a profound liberalisation of its cocoa 
sector in 1996, in order to increase producer incomes and develop private export participation, 
and maintain a high quality of produced cocoa. This was achieved through an inclusion of the 
private sector in the design stage of the reform process, a clear dialogue with all participants 
in order to coordinate all interests and a detailed information system on international market 
prices to enable producers to more easily choose between buyers and receive proper prices. 
The reforms increased the producers’ share of the world market price from under 60 percent 
before the reform to around 80 percent in 1997, resulting in increased production. Due to the 
cooperation between the government and private actors concerning quality controls, the high 
quality level was maintained and Togo still receives a higher cocoa price than average world 
market price.
24
  
 
In sum, as a result of its rapidly implemented reforms, Nigeria’s cocoa quality decreased 
significantly, the country lost its price premium and experienced decreasing cocoa sales. In 
Côte d’Ivoire production of cocoa increased, which turned out to be unprofitable since the 
country is a price-maker on the world market, leading to deteriorating cocoa prices. The 
country was later afflicted by social unrest, and liberalisation did thus not on the whole 
improve the performance of its cocoa sector. In Cameroon and Togo, liberalisation resulted in 
increased production and higher producer prices. The quality level decreased in Cameroon, 
but it was maintained in Togo, mainly because the private sector was included in the design 
stage of the reform process and because Togo introduced a detailed information system, 
aiding farmers in their choice of buyers.  
 
                                                 
22
 Varangis & Schreiber, 2001, p 47-49 
23
 ICCO, 2008, p 36 
24
 Laven, 2005, p 26-28 and Varangis & Schreiber, 2001, p 78 
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4 Structure and Reforms of the Ghanaian Cocoa 
Sector 
 
This section starts with a background to the structure and reforms of the cocoa sector in 
Ghana, focusing on the development of the cocoa sector and Ghana’s overall political and 
economic development. Thereafter the cocoa sector is presented, starting with the structure 
and implemented reforms of the sector and continuing with a presentation of the functions of 
the internal and external market chains.  
4.1 Background 
The colonial government was until the end of World War II little involved in the cocoa sector 
which was dominated by private international manufacturing and processing companies. For 
the purpose of gaining bargaining power towards international companies, purchasing of 
cocoa was after the war overtaken by the British government. In 1947 the Cocoa Marketing 
Board (CMB) was established and given sole responsibility of exporting cocoa through its 
wholly-owned subsidiary the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC). The main beneficiary of 
export earnings was the government. Several licensed buying companies (LBCs) operated on 
the internal market as buying and transportation companies for the CMB.
25
 The producer 
price was determined by the world market price and a tax, but the system was eventually 
abandoned in favour of a marketing board system with fixed nominal producer prices that 
granted the CMB high shares of the world market price.
26
  
 
After independence in 1957 the responsibilities of the CMB and the structure of the cocoa 
sector remained unchanged until 1961 when the multiple buying system was replaced by a 
monopsony system. This system was abandoned as early as 1966 and the system with licensed 
buying companies was re-introduced. At the same time a state-owned buying company was 
established, the Produce Buying Company (PBC), to operate alongside the private-owned 
buying companies. The monopsony system was introduced again in 1977 with the PBC as the 
sole buying company operating on the internal market chain.
27
 
                                                 
25
 Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment, 2008, p 29 
26
 Leith & Söderling, 2003, p 22 
27
 Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment, 2008, p 29 
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Prior to independence, the world market price of cocoa was high, enabling the CMB to pay 
farmers relatively high producer prices. As a result, planting of cocoa trees, and hence the 
country’s capacity for growing cocoa, increased substantially. From 1950 to 1960 production 
of cocoa doubled. Due to Ghana’s large share of world cocoa exports (it averaged around 30 
percent of the world market between 1911 and 1978) the production increase depressed world 
market prices. This price decrease affected farmers negatively, but from the government’s 
point of view the loss of revenues due to lower prices was compensated for by an increased 
demand for cocoa.  
 
The use of fixed nominal producer prices and high domestic inflation led to a further decrease 
of the producer price. Despite the important role of the cocoa sector (at the time of 
independence, cocoa was the country’s largest single source of government revenues) the new 
government paid it very little attention. The negative impact of decreasing prices on 
production therefore became apparent only in the middle of the 1960s and was invigorated by 
increased smuggling of cocoa to Côte d’Ivoire, which offered farmers higher producer 
prices.
28
  
 
The government’s use of fiscal and monetary policies created an overall excess demand in 
Ghana. Despite the use of import-licensing and exchange rate controls, the pressure on the 
balance of payment turned the net foreign assets in the monetary system negative. The real 
exchange rate had by 1966 appreciated by 50 percent since independence and the international 
competitiveness as well as the share of exports of GDP decreased sharply. The military, 
which took power in Ghana in 1966, devaluated the currency in 1967 in an attempt to restore 
the balance of payment. The price of foreign exchange increased by 43 percent while the 
nominal producer price increased by only 30 percent, which implied that the government took 
a larger share of the cocoa revenues. The increase was not enough to cover many years of 
increases in the nominal producer price by less than the inflation rate, leading to additional 
real term decreases in the price received by farmers. The producer price however benefited 
from a major recovery of world cocoa prices and it increased significantly in real terms.
29
 
 
The initial devaluation did not have the expected effects and a new devaluation was 
conducted in 1971, this time by a democratically elected government. The nominal producer 
                                                 
28
 Leith & Söderling, 2003, p 21-23 
29
 Ibid, p 24-26 
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price of cocoa increased, but again to a lower extent than the devaluation rate. Another 
military coup was carried out in 1972. One of the first actions of the new government was to 
revaluate the currency. The underlying fundamentals of the Ghanaian economy worsened 
quickly due to the government’s mismanagement of the economy. The boom of the cocoa 
sector however continued until 1973 due to good weather conditions, high international prices 
of cocoa and a successful mass-spraying scheme against cocoa diseases.
30
  
 
Years of political turmoil followed the military government, leading to a severe economic 
downturn of the Ghanaian economy. There were food shortages in urban areas, schools and 
health clinics were out of staff and infrastructure maintenance was heavily neglected. Even 
though elections were held, the political agitation continued. The nominal producer price 
increased with inflation, but this did not make up for previous decreases of the price in real 
terms. In addition, a severe drought in the beginning of the 1980s resulted in bush fires 
destroying huge areas where cocoa was grown.
31
 
 
Despite shorter periods of peak production, total cocoa output declined steadily between the 
late 1960s and middle 1980s. Low producer prices led farmers to shift to more profitable 
crops. Cocoa farmers were mainly of old age and illiterate, which obstructed adoption of new 
technology and disease and pest controls, and the lack of credit of cocoa farmers led to a lack 
of good planting materials for rehabilitation of old farms. The low income levels of cocoa 
farmers and the bush fires caused production in the beginning of the 1980s to drop to levels 
comparable with those in the 1930s.
32
  
 
A market-oriented reform program was launched in 1983 and the late 1990s, supported by the 
Washington institutions, aiming at increasing GDP, reducing poverty and eliminating rent-
seeking behaviour by government officials.
33
 The reforms of the cocoa sector were important 
elements of the overall reform process. 
4.2 Structure and Reforms  
The structure of the cocoa sector was prior to the reform process characterised by complete 
monopoly. The market was in the hands of the government which through the CMB was the 
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only authorised domestic buyer and exporter of cocoa. The CMB carried out its activities 
through its subsidiaries the PBC and the CMC. In addition, its subsidiary the Quality Control 
Division (QCD) was responsible for controlling the cocoa quality.
34
  
 
The first phase of the reform was initiated in 1984/85 and focused on restructuring the CMB. 
The CMB was made more streamlined by a reduction of the amount of staff from around 
100 000 employees to 6 000 and by a cut-down on overlaps in the organisation. The many 
operational and institutional changes of the CMB led to it changing its name to Ghana Cocoa 
Board (COCOBOD).
35
 During this initial phase attempts were also made to restructure 
production by providing farmers with seedlings to replace old trees, promoting transport and 
sales by constructing and upgrading roads and putting greater emphasis on extension services 
and the use of fertilisers and pesticides in production.
36
  
 
The second phase, which was implemented in 1993, consisted of a re-introduction of the 
multiple buying system and implied that private LBCs were once again allowed to operate on 
the domestic market together with the PBC.
37
 The objective of the liberalisation reform was to 
introduce competition on the internal market and improve the chain with regard to its 
operational and financial performance as well as open up for the possibility of paying higher 
competitive producer prices.
38
  
 
More recent reforms, aiming at further increasing the efficiency of the cocoa sector, were 
implemented in 1999 in the government’s Cocoa Strategy. These reforms involved reducing 
marketing costs and taxes of COCOBOD further and targeting the producer price to 70 
percent of the world market price by crop year 2004/05.
39
 In addition, the PBC was partly 
privatised in year 2000 and introduced on the Ghanaian stock exchange. COCOBOD owns 40 
percent of the stocks directly and another 30 percent indirectly through its ownership of a 
major stakeholder.
40
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The cocoa sector, as it is organised today, resembles a stabilisation fund and is portrayed in 
figure 4. The main players are farmers, LBCs and COCOBOD. In addition, various 
government and business groups providing extensions and inputs to farmers as well as bank 
and credit facilitators are important actors on the market. Hence the cocoa sector consists of a 
chain of economic activities related to production, transportation, quality control and 
marketing of cocoa.  
 
Figure 4: Structure of the cocoa sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even though the internal market has been partly liberalised, it is more or less controlled by the 
Ghanaian government. Through COCOBOD, the government controls cocoa quality, hands 
out licenses, finances and controls activities of private companies, sets producer prices and 
margins and sells and exports to manufacturing and processing companies. The QCD and the 
CMC are still subsidiaries of COCOBOD and have the same responsibilities as prior to the 
reforms. Moreover, COCOBOD finances a cocoa research institute, distributes subsidised 
inputs and hands out scholarships to farmers’ children.41 The bulk of the Ghanaian cocoa is 
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exported, while a minor share is sold to domestic processing companies, whose products are 
mainly consumed locally and at a lower price and quality compared to the exported cocoa.
42
  
4.2.1 Internal Marketing 
Ghana has, in comparison with other cocoa producing countries, one of the highest 
percentages of smallholders, i.e. farmers owning less than 5 hectares of land. The number of 
smallholders is approximately one million, whereas the overall number of workers in the 
cocoa sector is around 3.2 million, i.e. 14 percent of the population.
43
 Few farmers are 
organised in cooperatives. The farmers operate in 67 cocoa producing districts and in six of 
ten regions in Ghana. The cocoa producing regions are located in the southern part of the 
country.
44
 
 
Farmers transport and sell their harvest to the LBCs located at approximately 2 700 selling 
points across the country’s cocoa producing regions. In regions where the volume of cocoa 
production is low, the only operating LBC is the former subsidiary of COCOBOD, the PBC. 
Hence there is at least one outlet where farmers can sell cocoa in all cocoa growing areas.
45
 
COCOBOD buys all cocoa that is of required quality, implying that cocoa production is a 
relatively secure income compared to other types of crop production. The economic risks 
facing farmers are related to price fluctuations and yield levels, which to a large extent depend 
on the world market price of cocoa and on diseases and tree stock losses.
46
  
 
The cocoa is inspected, graded and sealed by the QCD, for which the LBCs pay a fee. The 
quality control is performed at several stages along the domestic market chain; at the villages, 
at the depots, at the port when the cocoa arrives and immediately before exports.
47
 The LBCs 
hire Purchasing Clerks (PCs) to do the purchasing of cocoa at community and village level, 
working on commission equal to a fixed percentage per bag of cocoa.
48
 The LBCs transport 
the cocoa from the country-side to designated take-over centres, where they are given a Cocoa 
Take-Over Receipt (CTOR) stating the amount of cocoa handed over to the CMC. The CTOR 
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is submitted, together with other invoices, to COCOBOD for payment.
49
 The value added at 
the various stages of the chain is small – the cocoa is fermented and dried by farmers and 
packed and sealed by the LBCs. There are very little exports of processed cocoa products 
from Ghana.  
 
Ghana has a reputation as a high quality producer of cocoa which allows COCOBOD to trade 
the cocoa on the forward market, allowing it to pre-finance its cocoa purchases.
50
 COCOBOD 
receives cheap foreign currency loans from international banks by using contracts from the 
forward sales as collateral. The loans are used partly to finance state expenditures and partly 
to set up a fund to finance the operations of the LBCs.
51
 The latter is called the seed fund and 
allows the LBCs to finance its purchases with loans below market rates. The loans are 
distributed in the beginning of the season. The LBCs officially have the right to export 30 
percent of the harvest, but no export licenses have yet been granted.  
 
COCOBOD previously provided extension and input services (education, seeds, fertilisers 
and pesticides etc.) through its subsidiary COCOBOD Service Division (CSD). For savings 
and efficiency reasons, the CSD was in 2000 merged with a government division and made 
more autonomous. Since then provision of extension and input services has been insufficient 
and underfinanced. There is approximately one agric officer per 3 000 farmers and the 
officers are oftentimes illiterate, receive low salaries and lack accurate transportation.
52
 
 
There is no limit in entry of becoming a farmer and farmers can sell their cocoa to any LBC 
they like. The number of LBCs operating on the market is regulated by COCOBOD and their 
activities are subject to regulations. The competition between farmers is limited, since all 
cocoa of sufficient quality is marketable at a minimum producer price, and so is the degree of 
competition of COCOBOD because of its monopoly position in exports. Hence the act of 
competition on the internal market chain in Ghana is limited to purchasing and transport 
activities by the LBCs.  
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Prices and Margins 
To reduce the negative impact of price fluctuations on farmers, a fixed producer price is set 
every year by the Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC), comprising representatives 
from the government, COCOBOD, farmers, the LBCs, University of Ghana and different 
business groups.
53
 The producer price is a price floor, i.e. the LBCs are not allowed to 
purchase cocoa for less than the producer price. Even though there are no formal restrictions 
against raising the price above the price floor, it is not raised above the minimum level. The 
producer price, which is based on the predicted average world market price of cocoa, is set in 
the beginning of each crop year and is constant throughout the seasons.
54
  
 
In addition to setting the producer price, the PPRC sets a yearly fixed purchase price, i.e. the 
price that the LBCs receive from selling the cocoa to COCOBOD.
55
 This so-called buyer’s 
margin is set at levels that take into account average transport costs, commissions to PCs and 
other costs faced by the LBCs and at levels where the LBCs break even. Each LBC faces the 
same buyer’s margin.56  
 
When the world market price of cocoa fluctuates, there is a discrepancy between the actual 
and the predicted price, the latter on which the producer price is grounded. This implies that 
there will be surpluses or deficits in relation to the targeted level depending on how the world 
market price fluctuates. The surplus is divided between the government and the farmers, while 
the deficit is covered by the government alone. Farmers receive the surplus in form of yearly 
bonuses after payment.
57
  
Regulations and Guidelines  
The undertakings of the LBCs are heavy regulated by COCOBOD. They apply to all LBCs 
equally and the PBC is not subject to additional obligations or exemptions apart from its 
geographical coverage.  
 
In order to obtain a licence, companies must comply with criteria set up by COCOBOD 
related to the organisation and structure, the operational strategy and the financial strength of 
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the companies. In addition, applicants must demonstrate that they have access to tools of 
trade, warehousing facilities and vehicles or transport facilities. It is also required that the 
companies have the capacity to purchase a minimum of 2 000 tons of cocoa the first crop 
year. The location and condition of the warehousing facilities must be approved of and 
certified by the QCD. Applicants that meet the requirements, or certain key requirements, are 
granted licenses or, in the latter case, temporary licenses.
58
 The applications are reviewed by 
the Cocoa Sector Marketing Committee (CSMC), consisting of representatives from the 
Board of Directors at COCOBOD, banks, University of Ghana and farmers, which makes 
recommendations to COCOBOD’s Board of Directors. The registration procedure takes on 
average one year. COCOBOD has no strategy with regard to how many LBCs that can 
operate on the market and all applicants fulfilling the requirements are approved licenses.
59
  
 
The licenses are renewed annually based on the performance of the LBCs. If the operational 
requirements are violated or if the LBCs fail to carry out operations for two crop years in a 
row, the companies are suspended until minimum requirements are met. The operational 
requirements of the LBCs concern what type of bags to use, packing requirements, grading 
and sealing procedure, bagging weight, minimum capacity of the sheds, when to disinfect 
sheds etc. The care and the storage of cocoa are subject to inspections by the QCD. In 
addition, the LBCs shall declare returns weekly to COCOBOD and submit an operational 
report and an audited financial statement annually.
60
  
4.2.2 External Marketing 
During the reform process the government had the intention of liberalising the external market 
of cocoa, thus allowing the LBCs to export. From the year 2000, LBCs meeting the conditions 
set by the government are officially allowed to export 30 percent of their purchases. It was the 
intention that the 30:70 split between the LBCs and the CMC was to exist during a transition 
period ending in crop year 2002/03.
61
 No export licenses have been granted and an interview 
with a COCOBOD representative indicates that there is no intention of the government to 
implement the reform.
62
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The reason advanced by the government for maintaining the monopsony structure of the 
sector is to guarantee high quality and contract fulfilment for which Ghanaian cocoa receives 
a price premium on the world market. Since it is difficult to monitor purchasing activities, the 
government fears that quality will deteriorate and that Ghana will lose the premium. Other 
reasons put forward by COCOBOD are that the LBCs are neither ready nor interested in 
exporting and that the government, and hence the country, now directly benefits from cocoa 
exports.
63
 It has also been argued that the government’s reluctance to open the market to 
competition is Ghana’s weak tax system; hence with a deregulated system the government 
loses a large part of its revenues.
64
  
 
By contrary most LBCs report that they want to enter and would be capable of entering the 
export sector and that COCOBOD deliberately hinders them from engaging in external 
marketing. The possibility of full deregulation was in fact one of the main motives for one of 
the two internationally owned LBCs to enter the cocoa sector in the first place.
65
   
 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) initially put pressure on the 
Ghanaian government to liberalise the external market. However, since COCOBOD increased 
producer prices and made efforts to increase output, the Washington institutions do not seem 
to put emphasis on further reforms.
66
 International processing and manufacturing companies 
do not oppose the system in Ghana, most likely because Ghana is the only country in the 
world offering a consistent supply and relatively low price of high quality cocoa.
67
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5 Competition in the Ghanaian Cocoa Sector 
 
The objective of the liberalisation reform was to introduce competition on the internal market 
and by this improve the sector’s operational and financial performance and open up for higher 
competitive producer prices. This sections looks into the degree of competition on Ghana’s 
domestic market in terms of number and coverage of the LBCs and their competitive 
weapons.   
5.1 Licensed Buying Companies 
The number of registered LBCs has increased gradually since the liberalisation reform. 
Initially six companies were granted licenses to operate on the internal market while today 
there are 26 active LBCs, including the PBC. Table 2 portrays the ranking of LBCs by market 
shares and it shows that the number of active LBCs increased from 16 to 26 between crop 
year 2004/05 and 2008/09. The average number of LBCs per village increased by around 30 
percent between 2002 and 2004, which implies that the potential trading partners of cocoa 
farmers have increased significantly over the years.
68
  
 
One can divide the LBCs into four categories depending on the ownership structure of the 
company. The first category comprises the former subsidiary of COCOBOD – the PBC. The 
second category of LBCs consists of domestically owned LBCs. Many of these Ghanaian 
companies are former transport companies that were contracted by COCOBOD prior to the 
liberalisation reform. Global Haulage is an example of a successful former transport company 
that today is key shareholder in three major LBCs – Adwumapa, Federated Commodities and 
TransRoyal.
69
 Category three constitutes of the farmer-based fair trade cooperative Kuapa 
Kokoo. Kuapa Kokoo was established in 1993 by a group of farmers and with support from 
the British NGO TWIN Trading Limited.
70
 The fourth and final category of LBCs comprises 
the two international companies, Singaporean-owned Olam and British-owned Armajaro. 
Both Olam and Armajaro are leading suppliers of cocoa and other commodities (such as 
coffee and sugar) on the world market and operate in all main cocoa producing countries. In 
Ghana they operate as buying companies, but their expertise includes origination, exporting 
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and processing of cocoa.
71
 The international companies have access to foreign capital, an 
advantage that makes them less dependent on the seed fund.
72
  
 
Table 2: Ranking LBCs by market shares
 
* License withdrawn, ** Newly licensed LBC, *** Ongoing season 
Source: Statistics from COCOBOD, 2009 
 
Table 2 reveals that the PBC has the largest market share with a five-year average market 
share of around 33 percent. The second largest LBC is the domestically owned company 
Akaufo Adamfo with an average market share of close to 12 percent. Olam, with its 
approximate market share of 11 percent, is the third largest LBC. The Glaubal Haulage owned 
LBCs Adwumapa, Federated Commodities and TransRoyal are at fourth, fifth and seventh 
place, while Kuapa Kokoo and Armajaro are at sixth and eighth place. The eight largest LBCs 
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LBC
2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009* 5-Year Average
1 Producer Buying Company 37,60% 32,76% 30,28% 30,63% 32,87% 32,83%
2
Akuafo Adamfo Marketing Co. 
Ltd.
13,11% 11,37% 9,29% 12,63% 13,45% 11,97%
3 OLAM Ghana Ltd. 13,18% 13,87% 11,47% 7,94% 7,11% 10,71%
4 Adwumapa Buyers Ltd. 7,24% 8,95% 9,75% 9,02% 8,14% 8,62%
5 Federated Commodities Ltd. 6,77% 6,82% 7,57% 6,90% 7,14% 7,04%
6 Kuapa Kokoo Ltd. 6,80% 6,61% 5,58% 5,29% 5,27% 5,91%
7 Transroyal Ghana Ltd. 5,06% 5,70% 6,71% 5,57% 5,54% 5,72%
8 Armajaro Ghana Ltd. 5,36% 4,97% 5,12% 6,86% 6,21% 5,70%
9 Cocoa Merchants Ghana Ltd. 2,21% 2,37% 3,59% 3,33% 4,36% 3,17%
10 Diaby Company Ltd. 0,09% 1,23% 4,03% 4,24% 3,91% 2,70%
11 Dio Jean Company 0,38% 1,26% 1,73% 1,30% 0,66% 1,07%
12 Royal Commodities Ltd. 0,45% 0,79% 1,09% 1,19% 1,69% 1,04%
13 Sika Aba Buyers Ltd. 0,10% 0,89% 1,00% 0,99% 1,24% 0,84%
14 Chartwell Ventures Ltd. - 0,13% 0,95% 2,25% 0,68% 0,80%
15 Sompa Kokoo Ltd. 0,90% 0,68% 0,52% 0,43% 0,49% 0,60%
16 West Africa Exchange Co. Ltd. 0,33% 0,49% 0,75% 0,26% 0,07% 0,38%
17 CocoExco Ltd.* 0,41% 1,12% - - - 0,31%
18 Evadox Ltd. - - - 0,93% 0,45% 0,28%
19 Sunshine Commodities Ltd.* - - 0,57% - - 0,11%
20 Allied Commodities Ltd. - - - 0,10% 0,25% 0,07%
21 Fereday Company Ltd. - 0,04% 0,03% 0,10% 0,12% 0,06%
22 Farmers Alliance Co. Ltd.** - - - 0,03% 0,10% 0,03%
23 CDH Commodities Ltd.** - - - - 0,11% 0,02%
24
Ghana Co-operative Marketing 
Co. Ltd.
- - - 0,01% 0,05% 0,01%
25 Aba Pa Golden Ltd.** - - - - 0,05% 0,01%
26 Yayra Glover Ltd.** - - - - 0,04% 0,01%
27 Aboafo Buying Co. Ltd.** - - - - 0,01% 0,00%
28 Duapa Buyers Co. Ltd.** - - - - 0,01% 0,00%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Market Share (%)
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together purchase around 90 percent of all cocoa while the remaining companies only have 
marginal shares. This implies that the market is dominated by few big players.  
 
When dividing the market shares into its categories, shown in figure 5, it is revealed that 
domestically owned LBCs have increased their shares over the five-year period, while the 
shares of both Kuapa Kokoo and of Olam and Armajaro have decreased. The PBC strongly 
decreased its market shares in 2004/05 and 2006/07, but reversed the trend the years after. 
The reason for the increasing shares of domestically owned companies may be due to that 
several of the LBCs not being active in the beginning of the time period later started operating 
on the market and that more domestically owned LBCs have been granted licenses.   
 
Figure 5: LBCs by market shares and type of LBC 
 
Source: Statistics from COCOBOD, 2009, and own calculations 
5.2 Competition Strategies 
One notable feature of the internal market is that the LBCs do not compete in prices. Instead 
of paying farmers a top up to the producer price, the LBCs offer competitive weapons based 
on cash payment, non-economic motivations and/or different incentive packages. Examples of 
non-economic competitive strategies are allowing community representatives to select the 
PCs or letting the PCs become socially involved with farmers.
73
 Incentive packages offered 
by LBCs may comprise services, credit, subsidised inputs and/or handing out small things 
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ranging from soaps, pens and school books to Wellington boots, torches and machetes, 
depending on the amount of cocoa sold to the LBC.
74
 Other examples of incentive strategies 
are guaranteeing farmers an accurate scale (by having a standard weight at the depots), 
handing out annual farmer’s awards, bonuses and “scratch lots” (with prices comprising 
anything from money to spraying items), and organising farmer forums.
75
  
 
The most frequently mentioned reasons by farmers for choosing a particular buyer are cash 
payments, social relations with the PC, provision of credit, and in the case of the PBC, its 
accountability.
76
 The motives are presented in figure 6 and confirmed in interviews with 
farmers.
77
 
 
Figure 6: Main reasons for farmers’ choice of LBC 
 
Source: Laven, 2005, p 36 
 
According to regulations, the LBCs are required to purchase cocoa with so-called akuafo 
(farmers) cheques. The cheque system was introduced by COCOBOD in the 1980s with the 
intention of encouraging farmers to save money, reduce the risk of fraud and avoid handling 
large amounts of money at the depots and villages.
78
 There are several problems related to the 
cheque system, e.g. remoteness of farmers, farmer-banking relations and liquidity problems in 
local banks.
 
For these reasons, in practice there has been a gradual shift towards cash 
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payments and the majority of the LBCs today offer both types of payments. While large scale 
farmers usually prefer cheque payments the majority of farmers prefer cash payments.
79
 
 
There is a tendency of farmers selling their cocoa to only one buyer and farmers seldom sell 
to more than two buyers.
80
 In addition, in interviews with farmers in Anwona community, 
farmers have indicated that they seldom or never receive incentives from the LBCs (besides 
cash payments) and that competing LBCs almost never try to persuade them to sell the cocoa 
to them. Another study has shown similar results.
81
  
 
The availability of cash with regard to inputs such as labour and chemicals is important in 
production of cocoa. Farmers are generally liquidity constrained and need credit in order to 
maintain or expand production. The demand for credit is confirmed in interviews with 
farmers.
82
 Many LBCs are reluctant to provide credit since they mistrust farmers.
83
 If the 
LBCs give farmers credit in return for a guarantee of cocoa it cannot be guaranteed that the 
farmers will supply the cocoa to them and not to their competitors.
84
 Furthermore some LBCs 
have experienced problems with theft, i.e. when farmers have not returned the loans. Hence 
most LBCs do not provide credit or only provide credit to large-scale farmers.
85
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6 Evaluating Performance of the Ghanaian Cocoa 
Sector 
 
This section aims at analysing the performance of the Ghanaian cocoa sector and relates 
performance to the structure of the internal market chain, with a focus on the effects of the 
reforms. The dimensions of performance which the thesis relates to are producer prices, 
production, yields and quality levels. These dimensions are important since they are vital for 
evaluating the capacity of the sector and because the intention of the reforms was to increase 
the first three, while maintaining quality levels.   
6.1 Producer Price 
One major goal of liberalised cocoa sectors is increased producer prices, to be gained through 
increased competition and lower costs. The experiences from other countries, which to a 
larger extent have liberalised their cocoa sectors, is that marketing costs and taxes are lower, 
implying a more efficient system and higher producer prices.  
 
The reforms of the Ghanaian cocoa sector resulted in an increase of the producer price, but 
persisting macroeconomic problems implied that the real price increase lagged behind during 
most of the 1990s and real gains for farmers were thus initially low.
86
 The producer price 
increased from 320 USD/tonne in 1993 to a top level of 1 010 USD/tonne in 2003, see figure 
7. Since then prices have been fairly constant. The producer price is, as a result of 
COCOBOD’s high share of the world market price, substantially lower in Ghana than in other 
cocoa producing countries. Having in mind that Ghana receives higher prices for its high 
quality cocoa, this indicates that the quality premium is not passed on to farmers. Hence it 
seems like COCOBOD benefits most from it. 
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Figure 7: The producer price in selected cocoa producing countries, 1991 – 2006  
 
 
Note: Calculated data. *Average of 10 (out of 11) largest cocoa producing countries in 2007 (Côte d'Ivoire, 
Indonesia, Ghana, Nigeria, Brazil, Cameroon, Ecuador, Togo, Colombia, Dominican Republic). Note also the 
dramatic changes in the Nigerian producer price, for which one possible explanation is macroeconomic 
instability due to political turmoil and an overvalued currency, which enabled buyers to purchase cocoa at prices 
above the world market price and make profits through currency transactions. To better show the difference 
between the producer prices in Ghana and the other countries, the figure does not fully show the fluctuations of 
the Nigerian producer price (which reached its top level in 1997 at approximately 4 100 USD/tonne).  
Source: FAO, 2009 and own calculations 
 
Before the reforms, the share of the world market price received by Ghanaian farmers could 
be as low as 20 percent.
87
 After the reforms, the producer price’s share of the world market 
price varied between 39 and 73 percent between 1996 and 2007, as seen in figure 8. The drop 
in the relative producer price in crop years 2000/01 and 2001/02 was due to a sharp increase 
in the world market price of cocoa during these years (recall that the producer price is set 
according to the expected world market price).  
 
In order to increase the producer price and ensure farmers high shares of the world market 
price, the price was targeted to 70 percent in 2004/05. The fact that the producer price from 
2005/06 and onwards has been lower than the targeted level may be because the expected 
world market price differed from the actual price and this later was corrected by the bonus 
system. However, as seen in table 3, which shows total bonus paid by the government, the 
bonus has ranged between 2.6 and 2.9 percent of the producer price. These small numbers 
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indicate that the bonus system, even if used to correct the discrepancy, did not fully adjust the 
price.  
 
Figure 8: The producer price in Ghana as percentage of the world market price, 1996 – 2007 
 
Source: ICCO, 2008, p 32 
 
Table 3 indicates that the government has distributed bonuses almost every year and that the 
error range has been fairly constant since crop year 2003/04. COCOBOD has stated in an 
interview that it is reluctant to lower the producer price, which may imply that the price is set 
with caution and perhaps slightly below the expected world market price. In addition, there 
have been signs of not all farmers having received the bonuses.
88
 This could confirm the habit 
of COCOBOD of not passing revenues on to farmers.  
 
Table 3: Total bonus paid by COCOBOD between 1999/00 and 2008/09 
 
Note: * Season is on-going 
Source: Statistics from COCOBOD, 2009 
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1999/2000 225,0 - -
2000/2001 347,5 17,82 5,1
2001/2002 620,0 12,18 2,0
2002/2003 850,0 31,78 3,7
2003/2004 900,0 21,87 2,4
2004/2005 900,0 nil nil
2005/2006 900,0 24,08 2,7
2006/2007 915,0 26,23 2,9
2007/2008 1 200,0 31,16 2,6
2008/2009* 1 632,0 - -
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Due to the lack of price-based competition mechanisms in the internal market, the producer 
price in Ghana reflects to a larger extent the world market price of cocoa and profit margins 
and costs facing various market participants and, to a lesser extent, the bargaining power of 
and between farmers, the LBCs and COCOBOD. The latter is reflected in farmers’ lack of 
capacity to put pressure on buying companies to raise the price above its minimum level and 
the LBCs’ inability to raise the buyer’s margin.  
6.2 Production and Yields 
There exists a direct relationship between increased producer prices and increased production. 
High producer prices stimulate the use of improved technology, pesticides and fertilisers and 
increase the incentives of farmers to conduct good farming practices, replant trees and expand 
production.
89
 Hence an additional goal with liberalisation is to increase cocoa output through 
higher yields and new areas harvested.  
 
Figure 9: Cocoa production in selected cocoa producing countries, 1980 – 2007 
 
Note: *Average of the 10 largest cocoa producing countries in 2007 (Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Brazil, Cameroon, Ecuador, Togo, Colombia, Papua New Guinea) 
Source: FAO, 2009  
 
As seen in figure 9, since the beginning of the 1980s, Ghana’s production of cocoa followed 
an upward trend, from approximately 200 000 tonnes per year to roughly 700 000 tonnes in 
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2007. After a relative decline in 2002, cocoa production increased sharply, due to good 
weather conditions, higher producer prices, improved agronomic practices and new areas 
harvested.
90
 As seen in the figure, most other cocoa producing countries in West Africa 
experienced increased production.  
 
As shown in figure 10, Ghana’s cocoa yield has been on average 25 percent below the 
average yield level of the ten largest cocoa producing countries and approximately 40 percent 
below the average yield level of neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. Reasons put forward to explain 
Ghana’s low yield levels are the relative old age of cocoa trees, the absence of widespread 
row planting, and pests such as black pod and mistletoes – explanations related to resource 
constrained farming practices.
91
  
 
Figure 10: Cocoa yields in selected cocoa producing countries, 1980 – 2007 
 
 
Note: Calculated data. *Average of the 10 largest cocoa producing countries in 2007 (Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Brazil, Cameroon, Ecuador, Togo, Colombia, Papua New Guinea) 
Source: FAO, 2009 and own calculations 
 
Figure 11 illustrates area harvested for cocoa production in Ghana between 1961 and 2007. It 
shows a declining trend, which was sharply reversed around 1994. The increased use of land 
for cocoa production may reflect that it has become more profitable for farmers to produce 
cocoa relative to other crops. It may also reflect that liberalisation seems to have improved 
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farmers’ access to cocoa purchasing companies. Even prior to liberalisation, the PBC was 
responsible for operating in all cocoa producing districts, but there have been signs of the 
company not always being present, leading to contingency of farmers. This problem has 
disappeared since the liberalisation reform.
92
  
 
Figure 11: Area harvested for cocoa production in Ghana, 1961 – 2007 
 
Note: Some statistics are estimations by FAO 
Source: FAO, 2009 
6.3 Quality 
Quality is important since it determines prices and reputation of cocoa. The high quality level 
in Ghana is an outcome of COCOBOD’s control system that promotes the use of adequate 
cultivation practices among farmers. In order for COCOBOD to continue selling its cocoa on 
the forward market and receiving the price premium, its reputation as a high quality cocoa 
producer must be maintained. Without the use of forward sales contracts as collateral for 
discounted international loans, the prevailing price setting system would not exist. Hence the 
possibility of setting a fixed producer price and other profit margins, as well as providing the 
seed fund to the LBCs, are dependent on the preservation of the market structure.
93
 In other 
countries, for example Cameroon and Nigeria, the presence of forward sales has to a large 
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extent been eliminated, since there is no marketing board or other governmental organisation 
in charge of guaranteeing export volumes.
94
  
 
It is argued that the quality of Ghanaian cocoa has declined since the liberalisation of the 
internal market. The LBCs are responsible for controlling the cocoa quality at community 
level and there have been indications that some LBCs, due to competition, pressure farmers to 
sell the cocoa before it has been enough fermented or dried.
95
 Hence, even with a fixed 
producer price, farmers do not have an incentive to hold the cocoa if they can sell it before it 
has been properly prepared. This practice has been confirmed in interviews with farmers and 
implies that farmers are not properly rewarded for maintaining good quality, which yet again 
indicates that it is mainly COCOBOD that benefits from the high quality standard.
96
 Other 
reasons put forward to explain the possible quality downturn are problems with smuggling of 
low quality cocoa from Côte d’Ivoire, fast increasing volumes of cocoa produced and 
extensive planting of hybrid trees.
97
 However, the quality level of Ghanaian cocoa is still high 
and the price premium received.  
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7 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The final section of the thesis consists of a summary of the reforms and impacts on the 
Ghanaian cocoa sector, followed by a discussion on how further liberalisation may improve 
performance.   
 
The reform programs launched in 1983, 1993 and the late 1990s marked the ending of 
decades of political chaos and economic turbulence that Ghana faced after its independence. 
One of the reasons for the economic downturn was the country’s neglect of its export sector 
of which cocoa constituted the major part. The reforms of the cocoa sector were important 
elements of the overall reform process, contributing significantly to the recovery of the 
Ghanaian economy. The main components of the reforms of the cocoa sector were the 
reconstruction of COCOBOD, the deregulation of the internal market chain and the targeting 
of the producer price’s share of the world market price. The reforms aimed at achieving a 
more efficient and productive cocoa sector and were initiated by the Ghanaian government 
and actuated by the Washington institutions. An objective of the proponents of the reforms 
was to raise the low production volumes caused by low producer prices, low yield levels and 
low incentives of farmers of growing cocoa.  
 
The reforms were to a large extent implemented. The restructuring of COCOBOD was carried 
out together with the implementation of pro-production policies. Ghana undertook a partial 
liberalisation of its cocoa sector, resulting in the presence of LBCs operating on the internal 
market. Their activities are heavily regulated by COCOBOD and there is thus no price 
competition between them. Liberalisation of the external market has not been followed 
through and there are no signs of it being liberalised in the near future. The producer price is 
targeted to 70 percent of the world market price. Even though it has not reached the target 
level, it is likely that the government will try to keep to it because of the positive relationship 
between higher producer prices and increased production. The reforms have resulted in an 
increased producer price, but it is still lower than in other West African producer countries. 
The yield level and the amount of land used for cocoa production have increased, resulting in 
larger output. The yield level in Ghana is however low in comparison with rival cocoa 
producing countries and the optimal capacity level may therefore not have been reached. 
Within the range of current reforms, the level of quality seems to have been maintained.  
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7.1 The Challenge of Further Liberalisation 
The reforms have had positive impacts on the Ghanaian cocoa sector, improving its 
performance significantly. In comparison with other cocoa producing countries in the region, 
there though seems to exist room for improvement concerning producer prices, production 
and yield levels, while quality levels in Ghana are substantially higher. This may be explained 
by the extensive governmental control over the cocoa sector, where the market structure 
restrains competition between LBCs. Ghana may for these reasons consider loosening internal 
market restrictions and liberalising its external market as an option for increasing its 
performance further.  
 
Further liberalisation may lead to higher producer prices through decreasing the government’s 
share of the world market price as well as increasing efficiency and decreasing costs of LBCs, 
enabling more efficient price competition. It may also lead to increased production due to the 
higher producer prices and thus increased incentives of farmers to grow cocoa, as well as 
increased yield levels, since higher prices may enable farmers to use more efficient 
production techniques and expand to new production sites. The aspect of maintained quality 
levels through liberalisation can be achieved if farmers have increased possibilities of 
receiving the price premium.  
 
Still, there is risk involved with further liberalisation. Many LBCs would not exist without 
access to the seed fund, since these companies, at least initially, would not have the financial 
means required to purchase cocoa. The structure of the cocoa sector secures the presence of 
these companies, which are almost entirely domestically owned. Within the current structure, 
it is difficult for the LBCs to develop and become independent companies. If it is desirable to 
have the internal market dominated by private Ghanaian companies after further 
liberalisation, it is important that these companies receive initial support.  
 
Ghanaian farmers are mainly smallholders and suffer from illiteracy and lack of organisation, 
implying that they have little bargaining power and small possibilities of getting access to 
accurate information on prices and buyers. The government currently provides farmers with 
services which increase production, e.g. information on production techniques and mass-
spraying programmes. (However recall that the CSD is underfinanced and the provision of 
many of these services is insufficient.) The private sector in Ghana is not very well 
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developed
98
, hence these services may not be fully provided by the market. In a further 
liberalised market, the role of the government is thus important when it comes to supporting 
farmers, e.g. in supplying information and inputs to production as well as forming 
cooperatives. The potential gains from liberalisation may otherwise not take place.  
 
A risk of further liberalisation is that the quality level may deteriorate. The main benefit of 
keeping high quality is that Ghana receives a price premium. Nonetheless, as shown in section 
6, it seems like it is currently mainly COCOBOD that benefits from the high cocoa price and 
farmers thus use expensive production methods without profiting from it. If the market is 
liberalised, farmers will instead be directly rewarded from keeping quality levels high, 
implying that quality deterioration may not be an effect of liberalisation in Ghana. This 
requires that farmers have accurate information on prices. There is otherwise a risk of buying 
companies taking control of the price premium.  
 
A common argument in favour of marketing board systems and stabilisation funds is that 
producer prices are stabilised yearly, decreasing the negative effect of volatility on 
production. There is a substantial risk that further liberalisation results in more volatile 
producer prices, but there are indications of the price volatility being limited. Seasonal price 
changes in Malaysia and Indonesia have for example been less than ten percent.
99
 If farmers 
have other income sources, producer price volatility will not necessarily translate into income 
volatility. Hence the necessity of having the government acting as price stabiliser may be 
questioned. If gains from further liberalisation outweigh the possible negative effects from 
price volatility, further liberalisation is preferable.  
 
Goals of liberalisation are on the one hand to increase the producer price and on the other 
hand to improve efficiency, often expressed in terms of increased output. According to supply 
and demand factors, a country with significant market power that increases its output 
contributes to deteriorated world market prices. The twofold goal of liberalisation can 
therefore be seen as contradictive.
100
 Ghana is currently a price-taker, implying that the 
potential risk of lowering the producer price through increased output is limited.  
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Lessons to be drawn from other West African countries that to a larger extent than Ghana 
have liberalised their cocoa sectors are that liberalisation should not be undertaken too fast, as 
in Nigeria, or under unfortunate circumstances, as was the case in Côte d’Ivoire with the civil 
war. It is also apparent from the experience of Togo that the liberalisation process is 
facilitated and better undertaken if the government lets private actors participate in the design 
stage of the reforms and ensures farmers well-functioning information systems. The case of 
Togo also shows that liberalisation does not necessarily lead to quality deterioration.  
 
In conclusion, the above argumentation indicates that further liberalisation is preferable, if 
undertaken with caution due to the mentioned risks.  
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Interviews and Meetings 
Meetings are considered less formal than interviews. When interpreter is not mentioned, the 
interviews and meetings were conducted in English. All interviews and meetings have been of 
great value for the work with the thesis, even if not all have been reference material in the 
final thesis’ layout. 
 
2009-04-06 Meeting with Rev. Dr. Samuel Asuming-Brempong in his office at 
the Department of Agricultural Economics and Agrobusiness at 
University of Ghana, Legon, Accra. 
 
2009-04-16 Meeting with Labaran Y. Barry, Director of Khuda Services (Gh) 
Ltd in his office, Tema.  
 
2009-04-17 Interview with Teophilus Asamami Adubi, tour guide at Tetteh 
Quarshie Cocoa farm in Mampong-Akuapou. 
 
2009-04-24 Interview with Mary Mabel Tarjoe, Deputy Manager of Research 
and Development Department at Kuapa Kokoo, in head office of 
Kuapa Kokoo, Kumasi. 
 
2009-04-24 Group interview with cocoa farmers in Bipoa society, Ashanti 
region. Interpreter: Emmanuel Appiah-Kubi, Research 
Development Officer at Kuapa Kokoo, Kumasi. 
 
2009-04-27 Interview with Seth Amoako Hammond, Administrative Manager 
at Armajaro Ghana Ltd, in head office of Armajaro, Kumasi. 
 
2009-04-28 Four interviews with different cocoa farmers in Anwona 
community, New Edubiase District, Ashanti region. Interpreter: 
Edward Nana Kutin-Mensah.  
 
2009-05-05 Interview with Cyril Lekettey da Pilma, Cocoa Executive at Olam, 
in head office of Olam, Accra. 
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2009-05-13 Meeting with A. Osei Boakye, Managing Director of the PBC, in 
head office of the PBC, Accra.  
 
2009-05-14 Interview with Francis Osei-Owusu, Deputy Director (R&D) of 
Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Department at The Cocoa 
House (head office of COCOBOD), Accra. 
 
2009-05-19 Interview with George Kwadwo Boateng, Deputy Managing 
Director-Operations of the PBC, in head office of the PBC, Accra. 
 
2005-05-21 Meeting with Francis Osei-Owusu, Deputy Director (R&D) of 
Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Department at The Cocoa 
House (head office of COCOBOD), Accra.  
 
 
 
 
 
